- Place Bunsen burner away from overhead shelving or equipment
- Remove all paper, combustible materials and excess chemicals from area
- Tie back long hair, loose clothing
- Inspect hose for cracks, holes, pinch points or other defects and ensure hose fits securely on gas valve and Bunsen burner
- Have a sparker with extended nozzle available before turning on the gas
- Turn on the gas slowly and do not open completely
- Adjust the flame to produce an appropriate flame for the experiment
- Do not leave flames unattended
- Shut off gas when flame is no longer needed
- Allow burner to cool before handling
Publications
Using Compressed Gas Cylinders
- Only move compressed gas cylinders with a proper cart, with the chain or strap secured
- Store upright in dry, ventilated areas, away from heat sources or electricity
- Store strapped into appropriate cylinder holder, with straps at 2/3 of cylinder height
- Store capped with valves closed when not in use
- When in use, only use appropriate pressure regulator
- All cylinders must be properly labelled
- Inspect cylinders regularly for damage or corrosion
Laboratory Standard Operating Procedure
This SOP applies to EVERYONE working in the laboratory.
Review BEFORE working.
1. Access to the laboratory is limited to staff, or other persons with permission of the Principal Investigator, when work with BSL-2 pathogens is being conducted.
2. Laboratory doors must be kept closed, but locking is at the discretion of the Principle Investigator.
3. Laboratory staff and all other persons working with infectious substances must wear gloves. Contaminated gloves must be changed immediately.
4. Laboratory staff must wash hands after handling infectious materials, after removing gloves, and always before leaving the lab.
5. Laboratory staff must not eat, smoke, handle contact lenses, or apply cosmetics in the lab.
6. Food for human consumption must be stored outside laboratory work area in refrigerators designated for that purpose.
7. Only mechanical pipetting devices must be used in the laboratory.
8. All sharps must be place in red sharps containers.
9. All non-liquid contaminated cultures, stocks, plates, and other biologically contaminated waste must be placed in biohazard waste containers for pickup by Stericycle.
10. All infectious liquids must be autoclaved or disinfected with 1: 10 bleach for one day prior to being poured into drain.
11. All procedures must be performed to minimize creation of splashes or aerosols.
12. As much work as possible with pathogens should be performed in the Biological Safety Cabinet.
13. All work surfaces must be decontaminated at the completion of work, at the end of the day, or after any spill or splash of viable material.
14. All laboratory personnel must be advised of potential hazards, and read the laboratory safety manual.
15. All support personnel must be made aware of hazards before working in the laboratory.
16. Spills and accidents that result in overt exposures to infectious materials must be immediately reported to the Principle Investigator and appropriate medical evaluation must be provided.
17. Laboratory equipment, surfaces, and other contaminated materials must be decontaminated with an effective disinfectant on a routine basis. Decontamination must also be completed after overt spills, splashes, or other contamination according to the Spill Control Procedures.
18. Contaminated equipment must be decontaminated before the equipment is repaired in the laboratory or sent out for repair, maintenance, or other purposes.
19. Lab coats must be removed and left in the laboratory before going to non-laboratory areas.
20. Lab coats must be laundered by the department, and should never be taken home.
21. Open-toed shoes must not be worn in the lab.
22. Laboratory doors must be locked when the laboratory is not occupied.
23. Bench tops should be kept neat, orderly, and accessible for cleaning.
24. Paper work stations are located away from hazardous materials and never within the level 2 laboratory zone.
Using Biosafety Cabinet (BSC)
BEFORE STARTING WORK
- Wear gloves and a lab coat
- Make sure UV lights are off
- Ensure sash is in correct position
- Check that air grilles are unobstructed
- Make sure air is flowing inward
- Disinfect all working surfaces
DURING WORK
- Don’t move your hands and arms in and out of the BSC excessively
- Keep contaminated material towards the back of the BSC
- If you’ve used it in the BSC, throw it away in the BSC
- Don’t use open flames
AFTER FINISHING WORK
- Leave BSC unused and running for 5 minutes
- Make sure all containers are closed before taking them out of the BSC
- Disinfect all contaminated material with 70% ethanol or 1% NaClO (1:6 bleach solution) for 15 minutes before taking them out of the BSC
- Disinfect all work surfaces in the BSC while it is still running
- Remove and dispose of gloves in the BSC
- Wash hands before leaving the lab
Biosecurity Plan
PHYSICAL PROTECTION
The lab will be locked at night when there is no one working in the lab. Unknown people entering the lab will be questioned and asked to leave.
Keys are issued only to Guttman lab members. Do not share your lab key with anyone.
All risk group 2 biologicals must be stored in spill proof, impact resistant containers in equipment that is locked and labelled (door signage)
BIOSAFETY LEVEL 2 ORGANISMS that can be used in the Guttman lab:
Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Burkholderia cepacia
Aspergillus fumigatus
Candida albicans
Clavibacter michiganensis (only for DNA extraction and sequencing)
Neisseria subflava, N. polysaccharea, N. bergeri (only for DNA extraction and sequencing)
PERSONNEL SUITABILITY / RELIABILITY
All lab members working with any biosafety level 2 organisms must be trained in biosafety protocols. Documentation of completion of training courses must be kept on file in the lab.
PATHOGEN ACCOUNTABILITY
The use, addition of new stocks, and disposal of any biosafety level 2 organisms must be documented in a log, stored in the lab.
Any discrepancies in the pathogen log must be reported to the Responsible Official. The Responsible Official will account for any discrepancy and report justification.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Unknown people entering the lab must be questioned and asked to leave. If they resist, campus police must be called to ensure their removal.
Intentional events like bomb threats will be reported to the campus police. For fire alarms, the lab doors will be locked and everyone will leave the building by the fastest route.
For unintentional events like spills, follow the SOP in the biosafety manual.
All samples containing biosafety level 2 organisms must be stored in equipment that is plugged into the emergency (red) power outlets, so power failures won’t impact storage / growth.
Emergency Protocol
BSC failure (alarm, loss of power):
- Don’t panic
- Stop work immediately
- Follow shut down procedures
- Report to PI
Emergency evacuation (fire alarm):
- Turn off any direct sources of heat (ie bunson burners, hot plates)
- Close any open containers of biologicals or chemicals.
- If there is time, wash hands before leaving.
- Take personal belongings (and coat).
- Get out – shut doors behind you. Doors should be locked.
Convergent evolution of dim light vision in owls and deep-diving whales
Gianni M Castiglione , Yan L I Chiu , Eduardo de A Gutierrez , Alexander Van Nynatten , Frances E Hauser , Matthew Preston , Nihar Bhattacharyya , Ryan K Schott , Belinda S W Chang
Curr Biol. 2023 Nov 6;33(21):4733-4740.e4. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2023.09.015
Pubmed: 37776863
Abstract
Animals with enhanced dim-light sensitivity are at higher risk of light-induced retinal degeneration when exposed to bright light conditions.1,2,3,4 This trade-off is mediated by the rod photoreceptor sensory protein, rhodopsin (RHO), and its toxic vitamin A chromophore by-product, all-trans retinal.5,6,7,8 Rod arrestin (Arr-1) binds to RHO and promotes sequestration of excess all-trans retinal,9,10 which has recently been suggested as a protective mechanism against photoreceptor cell death.2,11 We investigated Arr-1 evolution in animals at high risk of retinal damage due to periodic bright-light exposure of rod-dominated retinas. Here, we find the convergent evolution of enhanced Arr-1/RHO all-trans-retinal sequestration in owls and deep-diving whales. Statistical analyses reveal a parallel acceleration of Arr-1 evolutionary rates in these lineages, which is associated with the introduction of a rare Arr-1 mutation (Q69R) into the RHO-Arr-1 binding interface. Using in vitro assays, we find that this single mutation significantly enhances RHO-all-trans-retinal sequestration by ∼30%. This functional convergence across 300 million years of evolutionary divergence suggests that Arr-1 and RHO may play an underappreciated role in the photoprotection of the eye, with potentially vast clinical significance.
Keywords: Stargardt; age-related macular degeneration; all trans retinal; arrestin; blindness; evolution; owl; rhodopsin; vision; whale.
Adaptation of Antarctic Icefish Vision to Extreme Environments
Castiglione GM, Hauser FE, Van Nynatten A, Chang BSW.
Mol Biol Evol. 2023 Apr 4;40(4):msad030. doi: 10.1093/molbev/msad030.
Pubmed: 36763103
Abstract
Extreme environments, such as Antarctic habitats, present major challenges for many biological processes. Antarctic icefishes (Crynotothenioidea) represent a compelling system to investigate the molecular basis of adaptation to cold temperatures. Here, we explore how the sub-zero habitats of Antarctic icefishes have impacted rhodopsin (RH1) function, the temperature-sensitive dim-light visual pigment found in rod photoreceptors. Using likelihood models and ancestral reconstruction, we find that accelerated evolutionary rates in icefish RH1 underlie unique amino acid mutations absent from other deep-dwelling fishes, introduced before (S160A) and during (V259M) the onset of modern polar conditions. Functional assays reveal that these mutations red-shift rhodopsin spectral absorbance, consistent with spectral irradiance under sea ice. These mutations also lower the activation energy associated with retinal release of the light-activated RH1, and accelerate its return to the dark state, likely compensating for a cold-induced decrease in kinetic rates. These are adaptations in key properties of rhodopsin that mediate rod sensitivity and visual performance in the cold dark seas of the Antarctic.
Keywords: icefish; rhodopsin; vision.
Gut Microbiome Composition Is Associated With Future Onset of Crohn’s Disease in Healthy First-Degree Relatives
Raygoza Garay JA, Turpin W, Lee SH, Smith MI, Goethel A, Griffiths AM, Moayyedi P, Espin-Garcia O, Abreu M, Aumais GL, Bernstein CN, Biron IA, Cino M, Deslandres C, Dotan I, El-Matary W, Feagan B, Guttman DS, Huynh H, Dieleman LA, Hyams JS, Jacobson K, Mack D, Marshall JK, Otley A, Panaccione R, Ropeleski M, Silverberg MS, Steinhart AH, Turner D, Yerushalmi B, Paterson AD, Xu W; CCC GEM Project Research Consortium; Croitoru K.
Gastroenterology. 2023 Sep;165(3):670-681. doi: 10.1053/j.gastro.2023.05.032
Pubmed: 37263307
Abstract
Background & aims: The cause of Crohn’s disease (CD) is unknown, but the current hypothesis is that microbial or environmental factors induce gut inflammation in genetically susceptible individuals, leading to chronic intestinal inflammation. Case-control studies of patients with CD have cataloged alterations in the gut microbiome composition; however, these studies fail to distinguish whether the altered gut microbiome composition is associated with initiation of CD or is the result of inflammation or drug treatment.
Methods: In this prospective cohort study, 3483 healthy first-degree relatives (FDRs) of patients with CD were recruited to identify the gut microbiome composition that precedes the onset of CD and to what extent this composition predicts the risk of developing CD. We applied a machine learning approach to the analysis of the gut microbiome composition (based on 16S ribosomal RNA sequencing) to define a microbial signature that associates with future development of CD. The performance of the model was assessed in an independent validation cohort.
Results: In the validation cohort, the microbiome risk score (MRS) model yielded a hazard ratio of 2.24 (95% confidence interval, 1.03-4.84; P = .04), using the median of the MRS from the discovery cohort as the threshold. The MRS demonstrated a temporal validity by capturing individuals that developed CD up to 5 years before disease onset (area under the curve > 0.65). The 5 most important taxa contributing to the MRS included Ruminococcus torques, Blautia, Colidextribacter, an uncultured genus-level group from Oscillospiraceae, and Roseburia.
Conclusion: This study is the first to demonstrate that gut microbiome composition is associated with future onset of CD and suggests that gut microbiome is a contributor in the pathogenesis of CD.
Keywords: Faecalibacterium; Fecal Calprotectin; Microbiome; Preclinical Inflammatory Bowel Disease; Vitamins B.
AGENT for Exploring and Analyzing Gene Regulatory Networks from Arabidopsis
Vincent Lau & Nicholas J. Provart
Methods Mol Biol. 2023:2698:351-360. doi: 10.1007/978-1-0716-3354-0_20
Pubmed: 37682484
Abstract
Gene regulatory networks (GRNs) are important for determining how an organism develops and how it responds to external stimuli. In the case of Arabidopsis thaliana, several GRNs have been identified covering many important biological processes. We present AGENT, the Arabidopsis GEne Network Tool, for exploring and analyzing published GRNs. Using tools in AGENT, regulatory motifs such as feed-forward loops can be easily identified. Nodes with high centrality-and hence importance-can likewise be identified. Gene expression data can also be overlaid onto GRNs to help discover subnetworks acting in specific tissues or under certain conditions.
Keywords: Bioinformatics; Feed-forward loops; Gene regulatory networks; Hypothesis generation; Motifs; Protein–DNA interactions; Protein–protein interactions.